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1 Introduction
This paper explores the link between social mobility and growth through
investment in human capital. Our main interest is how the supply of high-
skilled workers evolves over time in the short-term as well as in the long-
term, how it is affected by éducation policies. and how it relates to the rate
of growth.
In most countries we observe during the last décades a significant in-
creasing proportion of skilled individuals among the population1. But simul-
taneously some developing countries (like most of sub-saharian countries)
remain with a very large proportion of low-skilled workers.
Macroeconomic models related to éducation, such as Lucas (1988),
cannot account satisfactory for thèse "éducation traps". Azariadis and Dra-
zen (1990) provide an explanation for économie development based on in-
creasing returns to éducation. Their model explains why économies with
similar technologies will converge to différent balanced growth paths. Un-
fortunately, their assumption of increasing returns has no microeconomic
foundations. Moreover their framework cannot account for distributional
effects. Galor and Zeira (1993) stressed that the existence of a fixed cost
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in 1994 (see Phelps and Zoega, 1996). They also find similar patterns for the other G7 countries.
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to enter éducation créâtes increasing returns to éducation if crédit markets
are imperfect. For any initial distribution of wealth, this induces long-term
ségrégation between educated and non-educated families. A feature of their
model, however, is that the long-term proportion of educated individuals
is always beiow the initial one and always decreases during the transition
path2. This seems inconsistent with stylized facts in most countries.
We propose a particular, but natural, assumption for the financing of
schooling. Altruistic parents finance (or not) university for their chiidren.
More precisely, they may finance the part of the university cost which is not
publicly funded. Since wealth is correlated with the éducation level, high-
skilled (HS) parents are more Ukely to pay higher éducation for their chiidren
than low-skilled (LS) parents. However, the model provides an original re
suit since, for some ranges of the distribution, complète intergenerational
immobility occurs3.
Our second main assumption concerns the human capital accumu
lation mechanism at school. This accumulation dépends on the "quality
of schooling". Several empirical offer cautious support for the position that
éducation resources, such as the teacher-pupil ratio, matter. Thèse resources
tend to improve, on average, student's test scores, graduation rates and/or
student's market outeomes (see for example Card and Krueger, 1992, or San-
der, 1993)4. This assumption is not new in the macroeconomic literature.
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) as well as Bénabou (1996) use the éducation
expenditures per student as a proxy for the quality of éducation. This for
mulation lias two main shorteomings. First, it neglects the opportunity cost
of teaching : teachers are withdrawed from the production of the final goods.
Eicher (1996) shows that this opportunity cost lias major implications for
the relative supply of skilled workers. Second, for non-compulsory schooling,
not only the number of teachers but also that of students is endogenous.
Consequently the quality of éducation, as measured by the teacher-pupil
ratio, is a function of a number of model parameters including the initial
distribution of income. We can then argue that there is a "congestion effect"
in éducation as the number of students (endogenously) increases.
Our framework is consistent with the différent dynamics observed in
the structures of skills across countries. As in other models with indivisi-
bilities in éducation spending and imperfect crédit markets, we show that
the initial level of skills in a family affects the skills of their offsprings. The
présence of congestion effects also lias major implications for the possible
dynamics of skills in the economy and, consequently, for the long-term ef
fects of éducation policies. Similar éducation policies may hâve différent ma
croeconomic implications depending on the distribution of skills. Contrary
to Eckstein and Zilcha (1994), an increase in public éducation expenditure
2 We are indebted to Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa for this remark.
3 Obvtously, this resuit may not hold if agents also differ in their abilities to acqutre human capital. See on this
point, Loury (1981) as well as Chiu (1998).
4 The debate on this subject is highly controversial. For example, Hanushek and al. (1996) advocates that
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may not hâve long-term positive effects on growth. In the short-term, such
a policy could stimulate enrollment at university, but the resulting aggra
vation of the congestion effect may discourage a durable increase in the
number of students. Such économies will remain in a trap. As in Azariadis
and Drazen (1990), this endogenous émergence of éducation traps results
frora threshold effects. But thèse thresholds dépend hère on educational po-
licies and on the human capital technology in university formation. There
are also explained by historical structures of skills. We say an economy is
captured in a low-skill trap when éducation policies are unable to (perma-
nently) increase the supply of skills. Yet thèse traps may occur at widely
varying levels of equilibrium human capital. Thus our model compléments
the literature on "development traps". Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990)
argue that poverty traps are due to endogenous fertlity décisions. Eicher
and Garcia-Penalosa (1999) explain traps as a resuit of an interdépendance
between the supply and the demand for skilled labor, when technical change
is skill-biased. Acemoglu (1996) and Redding (1996) claim that coordina
tion problems between firms and workers may also explain such traps. Our
explanation is based on technological assumptions but does not necessary
involve technical change5.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section présents the
basic model. Section 3 provides an analysis of the short-term equilibrium. In
section 4, we présent the dynamics. The study of the effects of the proportion
of high skilled is provided in section 5. In section 6, we study development
paths and assess the effects of educational policies. The last section contains
some concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider a three period lived overlapping générations model. Each period
t, there is a continuum of agents born at t of weight 1 which are identical,
but their parents are not.
Each agent born at t receives a basic formation, and a proportion of
them receives an additional formation (say at university) during their first
period of life. In period t + 1, when adult, he works, consumes, saves and
may pay the fee (finance the university) for his child. In his last period of
life t + 2, he is retired and consumes the gross return of his savings.
Parents in period t are either high skilled (HS) or low skilled (LS). The
Pt HS workers are those who benefited the additional formation in period
t—1. Their human capital level is hf and their wage income is wthat, where
wt is the wage per unit of efficient labor. The human capital of the 1 - pt
LS parents (those who only received the basic formation in period t — 1) is
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h° and their wage income is wth°. Parents choose to pay or not to pay the
fee (cost of additional formation) for their child.
2.1 The educational System
The basic formation in period t applies to ail agents and it is financed
publicly. It leads to a human capital level
h°t+i=$((*stPt,*Ot(l-Pt))ht (1)
which dépends on the number afpt of HS teachers (af is the proportion
of the pt HS workers who are teachers in the basic school), on the number
a°(1 — pt) of LS teachers and on the mean human capital level (of adults)
in the economy at date t :
+ (l-pt)h°t (2)
Assumption 1 : $ is an increasing function of its arguments : $i > 0,
$2 >0.
Assumption 1 follows empirical studies which conclude to a positive,
significant corrélation between the number of teachers per student and the
market outeomes of students (Card and Krueger (1992)). In the compulsory
formation, an increase in the number of teachers improves the teacher-pupil
ratio.
The cost of the basic éducation is the total wage cost of teachers6 :
This cost will be paid by the government through taxes on the wage
income.
The additional formation in period t only applies to pt+\ children,
whose parents accept to pay a fee, 7t. The main cost of éducation is given
by the teacher's wages, and higher éducation is provided mainly by HS
teachers. In order to capture this effect, we make the simplifying assumption
that the fee is proportional to the current HS wage :
eat = -ytwtht (3)
A low skill parent has to spend a higher share of his income than a
high skill parent in order to finance university to his child. The production
6 Workers and teachers wages are the same for an equal qualification (non arbitrage property). A simple
interprétation of the two types of teachers is the following. To teach the basic formation it is sufficient to hâve
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of hs dépends on three arguments : the number of university professors the
government finances {PtPt), the fee, yt, and the number of students pt+\-
Specifically :
l (4)
Assumption 2 : \& is an increasing function oi PtPt and 7tj but a decrea-
sing function of the number of students pt+\. Moreover
#(0,0, p) = 1 for allp^O.
The university formation increases the human capital level which re-
sults from the basic formation. Nonetheless, without spendings (0t = jt = 0)
there is no supplementary human capital accumulation. The number of stu
dents reduces the productivity of the university formation because students
congest the éducation System. Indeed, our function # may be viewed as the
reduced form of a formulation stressing the incidence of the teacher-pupil
ratio. At period i, there are 0tPt+1ftPt+i teachers and pt+i students. If the
productivity in the university formation dépends on its teacher-pupil ratio.
one obtains a function of f3'P<+™>+1 - êlEl + 7< Such a spécifie function
vérifies assumption 2.
The total financing by the government (including the basic formation)
is
gt = (aat + 0t)ptwth"t +<x°t(l- Pt)wth°t (5)
Assumption 3 : a\ > 0, a°t > 0, (3t > 0, 7,. > 0, ast + /3t < 1, a? < 1 for
ail t.
We assume positive and feasible proportions of ail types of teachers as
well as a positive fee. We are then concerned with mixed éducation Systems,
as they exist in most countries.
2.2 The consumers
An agent born in t - 1 works in period t. His human capital ht is either hf
or h° according to he has received or not the university formation.
With a tax rate rt on his wage income, the after-tax income of an
agent with a human capital ht is (1 - rt.)wtht. He consumes cu saves st,
and spends et for the university formation of his child. He chooses et either
equal to ef and the child receives the university formation, or he chooses
e( = 0 and his child does not receive this formation. Consequently :
ht+\ = hf+1 if et - ef
hi+i = h°+1 if e{ = 0
He maximizes his life-cycle utility which dépends on the human capital
level of his child. For reasons of tractability, we assume a log-linear utility150 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(2), 2003
fonction7 :
Ut-i = (1 -a) In q + a\ndt+1 + b\nht+i (6)
subject to the budget constraints :
(1 - rt) wtht = ct + st + et and dt+i = (1 + rt+i) st (7)
a and b verify : 0 < a < 1 and 6 > 0; rt+i is the interest rate on savings and
dt+i the consumption in period t+1.
Whatever the choice of et, the optimal décisions of consumption and
savings are :
ct = (1 - a) (Ùt - et), st = a (Qt - et), dt+l = (1 + rt+i)st (8)
where ût = (1 - n) wtht is the after-tax income.
The différence between the two life-cycle utilities f/ts_1 and U^_i cor-
responding the choice of et = ef and et = 0 is
b\nh°+ï)
where Wt+i = M+i/^t+i = *(Ap*>7t»Pt+i) is ^e ratio of the two possible
human capital levels for children.
As a conséquence, at date t, the optimal choice of an agent with an
after-tax income fii is
et = 0 if ùt < ^- (9)
He is indiffèrent between the two choices when fit = —^—r- and mav
choose et = ef or et = 0.
2.3 The firms
There is in each period one représentative fîrm producing one good with two
inputs, physical capital Kt and human capital (or efficient labor) Ht. The
production function Yt = F(Kt, Ht) is homogenous of degree one, increasing
7 This utility may dépend on the net income of the child (1 — 17+1 )u;(+1 h (+1 : this would not modify the
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and strictly concave with respect to each of the two production factors. The
firm maximizes its profits : F(Kt, Ht) - wtHt — (S + rt)Kt. wt is the wage, 8
the dépréciation rate of capital and rt the interest rate. At equilibrium the
wage is equal to the marginal productivity of labor :
wt = F'L(KtyHt) = F'L(kt,l) (10)
where kt = Kt/Ht is the ratio of the capital stock and the human capital
level used in production. The interest rate is equal to the marginal produc
tivity of capital net of dépréciation :
rt = F'K (Kt,Ht) -Ô = F'K (kt, 1) - 5 (11)
3 Short-term equilibrium
At date t, the capital stock K( is given and results from the savings décisions
made in period t — 1. The proportions pt of HS and 1 — pt of LS workers
are given and resuit from the éducation décisions taken by parents in period
t — 1. The corresponding human capital levels /if and h° are known.
3.1 The tax rate
Given educational policies a", a\, fit, the government spendings are given
by the relation (5). The tax rate rt is assumed to be chosen in order to
balance the government constraint. Since ail workers (including teachers)
pay the same tax rate, the tax income Ti(ptWthl + (1 — Pt)wth°) should
be equal to the government spendings gt. Using the ratio ^t = hf/h°, we
obtain :
71 =
Note that rt ^ max{û( 4- 0t,&°} which implies rt < 1.
3.2 The number of students at equilibrium
The productivity of the university formation ty(/3tpt,'yt,pt+i) dépends on
the number pt+\ of students. Since the after-tax income of HS workers is
larger than the LS one, there are three possibilities :
a) ail HS pay the university cost for their child, and no LS does it.
b) at least some LS pay it. and then ail HS pay it.
c) at leat some HS do not pay it, and then no LS pay it.152 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(2), 2003
Let us define, for fixed values of fit ^ 0, pt, 0 ^ pt < 1 and jt > 0,
) = F (13)
b
Pt(pt+i)wtht ù3 *ne minimum after-tax income for which a parent accepts
to pay the university cost for his child; pt(pt+i) is a measure of the ratio
of costs and benefits of the additional éducation. The function pt(pt+i) is
well defined and increasing for ail pt+i ^ 0, since the denominator does not
vanish, V(/3tpu~ftypt+1) > $(0,^,1) > 1.
We first consider interior values 0 < pt < 1. The three possibilities
are the following :
Case a. The students are the children of the HS workers, and pt+\ = pt-
For this to be an equilibrium with optimal choice of éducation by
both types of parents, the following inequalities should be satisfied
=pt :
Of = (1 - rt) wthf ^ pt(pt+i)wthst and Q° = —œt ^ pt(pt+l)wthst
or equivalently, the tax rate should satisfy :
PtM ^ 1 - n ^ ^tPtiPt) with *f = hat/h? (14)
Case b. At least some of the LS workers pay the university fee and pt+i >
Pt. There are two subcases :
• when ail LS workers pay the cost, pt+\ = 1, their income ft° should at
least be pt(l)wthf, Le.
\-Tt>*tPt{\) (15)
and then of course the HS workers pay it : 1 — rt > pt{\).
• When some LS pay the cost, but not ail, pt+i < 1, then the LS workers
are indiffèrent between paying or not paying it and
1 - rt = Vtpt{pt+i) with pt < pt+i < 1 (16)
Then of course ail HS workers pay the fee : 1 — rt > pt(pt+i)-
Case c. At least some HS workers do not pay the cost and thus pt+i < pt.
• When no HS worker pay the cost, the university formation disappears
(pt+i = 0). This occurs if
l-Tt (17)
• When some but not ail HS workers pay the cost, then
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In both subcases, LS workers choose optimally not to pay the cost :
\-n
Let us consider now corner values for the number of HS workers. In
the spécial case where pt = 0, there are no HS workers in period t, and thus
no teachers in the university. Then the fee does not exist (it can be assumed
arbitrarely large) and necessarely pt+i = 0. In the other spécial case, when
ail workers are HS, pt = 1, then case b is excluded and there are the three
possibilities :
if pt{l) ^ 1 - n (case a), then pt+i = 1.
if Pt{0) S* 1 - rtî then pt+\ = 0.
if pt(0) < 1 — rt < Pt{l), then there exists pt+\, 0 < pt+i < 1) such
that pt{pt+i) = l-rt.
Proposition 1 Given fit ^ 0, 0 ^ pt ^ 1, jt > 0, and 0 < rt < 1,
there exists a unique number of students pt+i- It is increasing, decreasing
or unchanged according to the value ofl — Tt is larger than ^tPtiPt)? smaller
than pt{pi), or between thèse two values.
Proof : See the appendix.
Let us consider any structure of skills among parents in an economy
with both types of workers. The number of students at equilibrium dépends
on the décisions of parents. Since parents hâve identical préférences, wealth
is the key déterminant of parental décisions. HS parents are richer than LS
parents and their relative income differential is given by tyt > 1- Moreover,
the cost and the benefits of university are the same for ail families (see
relation (13)). Thus, if at least one LS parent décides to enroll his child
at university, ail HS parents also enroll their children. For any policy, the
structure of skills in the next period is thus necessarely unique. There may
occur three exclusive equilibria according to the after-tax incomes of parents
and the ratio of cost and benefits of university.
The cost of university is proportional to the wage of the university
teachers. Since university teachers are HS agents, $?t may be viewed as a
"cost differential" between LS parents and HS parents. The other component
of the university cost is given by the fee. that is the numerator of pt{pt)-
The benefits from éducation dépend positively on the productivity of
university ^(PtPt'.ltiPt+i), which is common to ail students. The higher
this productivity (the smaller Pt(pt)), the more likely parents enroll their
children.
When the after-tax income of LS parents and the productivity of
éducation are high enough relatively to the cost of éducation, some LS
parents (at least) décide to finance university for their children. In such
a case, the number of students is increasing. On the contrary, when the
income of HS parents and/or the productivity of university are too low
relatively to the fee, some HS parents (at least) don't enroll their children
at university. Thus the number of students is decreasing. Finally, the case of154 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(2), 2003
intergenerational immobility occurs when LS parents are too poor to finance
the cost of university while HS parents receive a sufficient after-tax income
to enroll their children at university.
3.3 Equilibrium priées
The number of LS workers who are not teachers in the basic formation
System is (1 — a°)(l— pt) which is non négative if a° ^ 1; but the number
of the HS teachers (in both formations) (af + fit)Pt + itPt+i should be less
than the number pt of HS agents. When this is the case, the total labor
supply (in efficient units) made to the fîrm is :
Ht = (l-a°t)(l-Pt) h°t+[(l-ast-l3t)PL-ytPt+i)hst (19)
Then the labor market equilibrium détermines the current wage and
the current interest rate (since Kt is given) following (10) and (11).
In the case pt = 0, the economy works without university formation
and pt+i = 0. In the case pt > 0, there is a restriction on the fee and
the number of students. For an optimal choice of pt+i < pt (cases a and
c), it is sufficient that 7t < 1 - af - /3t;but in the case b, the condition
(1 - af — Pt)Pt > itPt+i for existence of an equilibrium is more restrictive.
It is verified when 7( < (1 — af - fît)pt-
Proposition 2 Given positive parameters af, a°, (3t and ~ft which verify :
ast + (3t < 1 and a° < 1, and given the past variables Kt > 0, pt > 0 and
^t = hf/h° > 1, there exists a unique short-term equilibrium at period t if
the unique solution pt+i defined in proposition 1 vérifies
(20)
Proof : See the appendix.
AU agents save optimally a proportion a of their income net of tax
and of fee. The total net income of the parents is
ptSlï + (1 - ptW - Pt+ief = wt [pt (1 - n) ht + (1 - pt) (1 - Tt) h° -
The total net income is necessarely positive since agents do not pay
the fee when it is larger than his income net of tax. Thus
Kt+i = a [(1 - rt) ht - ptithst] wt (21)
With \&t+i = hl+l/h°+l = ^(/3tpt,7f.iPt+i), ah1 equilibrium variables
are determined.Vincent Barthélémy, Philippe Michel 155
4 Dynamics
In order to keep the dynamics tractable, we introduce the following assump
tion.
Assumption 4: The parameters as, a°, (3 and 7 are positive. Moreover,
they verify as + 0 = a° and 0<as-f/3 + 7<l.
We assume that the government finances the same proportion of tea
chers in each type of agents HS and LS. With this assumption. the tax rate
is constant r = a°. The taxes paid by the LS agents, (1 — pt)rwth° are
then just the cost of the LS teachers in the basic formation (1 —pt)aowth°.
The taxes paid by the HS agents ptrwth^ are equal to the cost of the HS
teachers in both formations which is publicly funded pt{cxs -f 0)wth^.
The last part of assumption 1 implies that the fee is compatible with
at least one constant proportion p of HS agents or, equivalently, that the
éducation policy is driven so that the total proportion of high skilled teachers
is feasible.
Under this assumption, three types of dynamics may occur. As shown
in the former section, they may be studied in light of the proportion of HS
agents. We first présent the case of developing éducation which occured in
most countries over long horizons. Then we briefly discuss other feasible
dynamics.
4.1 Dynamics with an increasing proportion of HS
Let us define the cost-benefits ratio :
7
Bip.q) = 7-
1 — tyŒp, 7. q)~
This function is decreasing with respect to p and increasing with res
pect to q.
Proposition 3 With an initial distribution of skills, pq > 0, and a feasible
fee, 7 < (1 — r)po, the intertemporal equïlibriwn starting withpo exists and
the séquence pt is non-decreasing iff^aB{pQ,po) < 1 — r.
Proof : See the appendix.
In the initial period we assume an exogenous distribution of skills
with po > 0, and a human capital differential between HS and LS agents,
vJ>0 = /iq//iq. As we hâve seen in case b. at least some LS parents will pay the
fee if they consider university as a good investment. This occurs if they are
sufficiently wealthy agents (1 — r > \&oJ3(po,po))- In this case, the student
population rises since ail HS parents, wealthier than LS ones, also enroll
their children at university {p\ > Pq). Moreover the student population in
the newborn génération is unique.156 Recherches économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(2), 2003
If <&QB(p0,1) ^ 1-t, ail LS parents pay the fee to their children and ail
the young génération enters university (pj = 1). In this case, the congestion
efFect is maximal but not sufficient to undermine the productivity of the
university. The university remains attractive despite it is highly crowded.
If ty0B{p0,1) > 1 - r, an overcrowded university wouldn't be at
tractive for ail LS agents : its relative rate of return would be too low and
alternative investments (such as savings) would be preferred. Proposition 1
states that only some LS parents will pay the fee (1 > pi > pQ).
In order to détermine a short-term equilibrium in period t = 1, the
following condition should be verified (condition (20) in proposition 2) :
7Pl < (1 - r)p0
We assume a stronger, but sufficient. condition 7 < (1 — r)p0-
Let us notice that in the increasing case, the dynamics are (relation
(16)):
# (/3pt-i,7,pt) B (pt,Pt+i) = 1-r
which is a second order différence équation in pt. We show in the appendix
that, when this équation applies, the dynamics of pt is monotonie non-
decreasing. This implies that, in the absence of exogenous shocks, an eco-
nomy which initiâtes an increase in its HS population won't go back.
The non-decreasing séquence pt necessarely converges to a limit p ^ 1.
In the long term the growth rate is :
Gœ = $ (asp, û° (1 - p)) [1 - p + p* {0p, 7,p)]
Thus the ratio kt of the Kt and Ht converges to a stable steady state
of the dynamics
4.2 Other dynamics
The model is also consistent with cases both of social mobility and of a
decrease in the student population over long periods.
Social immobility
Social immobility occurs when ail children undertake the same type of for
mation as their parents. Ail HS agents pay the fee and no LS pay it (case a).
The number p of students is constant. It occurs when the following condition
applies (see (14)) :
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where <£ = VlJ(/?p,7,p) > 1. When p > 0, the condition for the existence
of the short term equilibrium, 7<l-as-/3=l — r, is then necessarely
satisfied.
Remark : Under assumption 2, for any value ofpo, 0 < p0 < 1, there exists
an interval of values for the fee 7 > 0 and an interval of values for the
proportion p which contains pu such that the equilibrium leads to a constant
P-
With such values of the parameters, ail short-term equilibria exhibit
a constant proportion p, and the two types of human capital accumulation
verify for ail t :
h°t+1 = $(asp,a°(l-p))ht and hf+i = #(/3p,7,p)/i?+1
Thus the mean human capital level grows at a constant rate
ht+l = Ght with G = $ (a*p, q"(1 - p)) [1 - p + p#(/3p,7:p)]
and the dynamics of A;*
kt+l = -^F'L(kt,l) (23)
are monotonie (since dkt+i/dkt > 0) and converge to some stable steady
state k* which is decreasing with respect to G.
Note that ail educational parameters a0, as, /?, 7 hâve a positive
effect on the growth rate. But G has a négative effect on the dynamics of
kt (équation 23).
The decrease in the proportion of HS
Given the initial value po, 0 < po < 1, the number of HS decreases if and
only if B{po,po) > 1 — r. Then either there exists some p, 0 < p < po,
verifying B(p,p) ^ 1 — r and in this case the séquence of pt converges to a
steady state value p where B(p,p) = 1 — r. Or for ail p, 0 < p < po, we hâve
B{p,p) > l — T, and in this case the séquence pt converges to 0; and it may
reach 0 after a finite number of periods.
When B(po,po) > 1 — r, the initial cost is too large when ail HS
workers would pay the fee. Thus. only a fraction of them will pay it, and
the number of HS decreases. But this will reduce the number of HS teachers
in the following period who are paid by the government (the tax rate r is
the same but the tax basis is reduced). Then the decreasing séquence pt
necessarely converges to a limit p which is a steady state of the proportion
of HS, if positive. If the limit is zéro, the university formation disappears in
the long-term.
Since pt converges to 0 or p > 0, the séquence of capital-efficient labor
ratio also converges and its limits is a steady state of158 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(2), 2003
where G^ is the limit growth rate of the mean human capital stock.
In the case where pt converges to p > 0,
G«, = $ (o-ft c?(l-p))[l-p + p*(0p, 7, p)]
In the case where pt converges to p = 0, Gx = $(0, ot°).
5 Effects of the proportion of high skilled agents
As shown by proposition 3, there is a continuum of différent values of the
proportion of HS leading (in gênerai) to différent growth rates in éco
nomies having the same educational parameters. Indeed, given an edu-
cational policy (a8,»0,/?^), the balanced growth rate is given by G =
$ (asp, a°(l - p)) [1 - p + pty{fip,i,p)}. There are three effects of the pro
portion of HS on growth. First, this proportion acts on the basic formation
through $. Second, it influences the rate of human capital accumulation in
the university, \&. Finally, there exists a skill effect in the economy : there
are p HS having the university formation, that is a higher human capital
level (# > 1) than the 1 - p LS. Let us study more precisely thèse three
effects.
The structure of skills in the economy dépends on the proportion of
HS agents. An increase in the share of HS raises the (stationary) popu
lation undertaking the university formation. Some LS parents finance the
university formation to their child. Next, their heir will also be HS. Since
the human capital level of HS is always higher than the LS one (<& > 1), an
increase in the proportion of HS induces a structural effect improving the
average human capital level in the economy. Nonetheless, a modification in
the proportion of the HS population also changes the productivity in both
formations. Given educational policies, the proportion of HS détermines the
number of teachers/professors but also the number of students in the uni
versity. This in turn altérâtes the productivity in the basic formation as
well as in the university. Moreover, the productivity in the basic formation
is shaped partly by the présence of HS teachers.
The university formation is optional. Hence, the size of the student
population corresponds to the proportion of the young whose parents fi
nance university fées. Moreover, a fraction as of HS adults are teaching
in the university. Consequently, in the long-term, an increase in the num
ber of teachers has two effects that are opposite in sign. On one hand, it
worsens the congestion effect in the educational System and then reduces
its productivity. Given the number of professors, there are more students
at university. The quantity and/or the quality of knowledge professors can
transmit to their students déclines. On the other hand, this increased pro
portion of HS raises the number of professors. Given the number of students,
this improves the productivity in the university formation (for the opposite
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tion only dépends on the teacher-pupil ratio, there is no long-term effect of
a change in the skills structure. Indeed, this ratio remains unchanged since
the number of professors as well as students grow at the same rate. The
two effects neutralize each other so that the productivity in the university
formation does not dépend on the proportion of HS. This emciency only
dépends on the proportion of HS financed publicly (and on fées). Given the
government budget constraint, this acts upon the ability of financing HS
teachers in the basic formation.
The basic formation is compulsory. Since there is no population
growth, the number of students is constant. On the contrary, the number
of teachers of each type changes with the proportion of HS. The number
of LS teachers cuts back with this proportion whereas the number of HS
ones increases. Hence, the overall effect is ambiguous and dépends on the
relative productivity of each type of teachers. When the allocation of tea
chers is efficient, the marginal productivities are proportional to wages :
$i/$2 = ws/w° = ty and the derivative as$\ - a°$2 lias the sign of
asty - a°. Under the assumption that the government finances the same
proportion of teachers of each type (a° = a" + 0), the proportion of LS
teachers will always be higher than the HS one. The sign of the derivative is
then ambiguous. In particular, a relatively high proportion of HS teachers
implies a relatively low public financing effort in the university formation.
Indeed, an increase in the number of HS teachers in the basic formation
significatively raises the number of HS teachers who might hâve relatively
few additional knowledge. Then, a very high proportion of HS doesn't gua-
rantee a high productivity in the basic formation. Even if the efficiency of
university teaching is large when the proportion of HS teachers is relatively
low in the basic formation, the effect of an increasing proportion of HS is
négative on $. The intuition of this resuit is very simple. If the basic for
mation is principally made by LS teachers and if their proportion in the LS
workers is constant, a decrease in the number 1 — p of LS workers cuts back
the number of teachers and, consequently, a decrease in the basic human
capital level.
Proposition 4 The global effect of the proportion of high skilled on the
growth rate results from three partial effects. First, a mean human capital
effect which is positive. Second, the productivity of the university formation,
which is positive when the effect of the number of teachers dominâtes the
congestion effect (there is no effect when this efficiency only dépends on the
teacher-pupil ratio). Third, the effect on the basic formation which dépends
on the proportion of the two types of teachers. It is positive if and only if
as^ - a° > 0.
Proof : See the appendix.
The effect of the proportion of HS on the growth rate combines two
positive effetcs and an ambiguous one. We shall assume in the next section
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6 Educational policies : an heuristic illustration
Let us consider two particular forms of the cost-benefits functions B(p,p) —
(1 - r) and ty(Pp,'y,p)B(p,p) - (1 - r) depicted respectively by the curves
(C) and (D) in the figure below. They allow to describe the dynamics of
the choices of HS and LS workers to pay the fee. The x-axis describes the
dynamics of p which is contingent to its initial value, p0.
Cost-benefits ratio (C), (D)
(D)
Figure 1 : dynamics of p
We can observe the three types of dynamics analysed in the previous
sections.
The sets of p where (C) ^ 0 and (D) > 0, i.e. bi>P2]U[p3,P4]U[ps,P6],
correspond to an invariant structure of skills in the economy. At each period
t ^ 0 given the educational parameters, HS workers pay the fee and LS ones
do not.
If po lies in an interval where (C) > 0, i.e. ]p2,Pz[U]p6,1], the séquence
of pt decreases.
In the other sets ]0,pi[U]p4,p5[ where (D) < 0, the séquence of pt
increases.
Note that an arbitrarely small initial value of p allows to reach the
interval [pi,P2]. In an economy where university doesn't exist, an initial
proportion of HS strictly positive could resuit from the existence of self-
taught agents.
Every interior point in any interval where the proportion of HS workers
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Consequentiy, there is no divergence following a local perturbation around
such a point. Nonetheless, there exist two types of intervais differing in their
boundary properties. "Stable extremities" intervais hâve the properties of a
sink : if a shock initially moves the proportion of HS workers in the economy
away from its boundary value (the proportions pi, p2, p*> and pq in the
figure), this proportion will converge to this bound. Thus, the shock has no
permanent, long-term growth effect. "Unstable extremities" intervais are
such that any shock leading the proportion of HS workers to leave the
interval has long-term growth efFects. Indeed, this proportion converges to
a stable extremity of the closest "constant proportion" interval.
Let us consider an economy with no intergenerational mobility. In ac-
cordance on the discussion above. we can describe the conséquences of a
transitory educational policy. In particular, we consider pure redistributive
policies which leave the tax rate unchanged (r = û° = as +{3). For example,
an increase in the proportion of HS workers financed publicly {(5) implies a
decrease in the proportion of HS workers employed in the basic formation
(as). If the economy lies in an "unstable extremities" interval8, such a po
licy may allow to leave a trap with low growth and to reach a higher growth
path. On the contrary, a policy promoting the basic formation leads to a
lower growth path. If the economy lies in a "stable extremities" interval,
thèse transitory educational policies won't hâve permanent growth effects.
As in Azariadis and Drazen (1990), we show that little différences in human
capital endowments, Le hère in the initial proportion of HS individuals.
may lead to persistent différences in growth rates across countries. Conse-
quently, some countries may initiate a higher growth path while others could
stagnate. This resuit of multiple equilibria results from the existence of indi-
visibilities in the financing of the additional formation. Thèse indivisibilities
imply increasing returns to éducation, as in Galor and Zeira (1993). Never-
theless, we extend this resuit in two ways. First, we exhibit intervais with
no social mobility. Countries may initially lie in a state of social immobility
(an interval with constant p). Families with HS parents remain HS perma-
nently while parents of LS families never pay university to their children.
As a conséquence, countries with identical educational policies but différent
initial proportions of HS hâve différent growth rates. Second, transitory
educational policies may hâve quite différent long-term effects according to
the importance of the HS population. Despite transitory educational poli
cies promoting university formation, some countries can't jump from lower
stages of the developement path to more rapid ones. They are trapped in a
low development stage. For example, a temporary decrease in the fee or an
increase in the proportion of teachers in the university formation9, which
increases the return to the additional formation, incites some LS parents to
8 At the bounds of such intervais, the cost-benefits curves are decreasing.
9 It is important to notice that thèse incentives hâve to be sufficient to leave an interval (which is characterized
by no social mobility). If so, some LS parents will pay the additional formation to their children and there is an
initial increase in p. Consequently, the magnitude of the educational policy has to be ail the more important
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finance university to their children. But, in subséquent periods, the univer-
sity becomes too costly and some HS parents won't pay it to their children.
In the long-term the proportion of HS workers converges to the upper bound
of the initial interval. At the individual level, some families could benefit
from the educational policy while others could suffer from it. But at an ag-
gregate level, there is no social mobility since the proportion of HS remains
constant (at least when the initial proportion of HS was at the upper bound
of the interval).
On the contrary, temporary educational policies may help countries in
reaching a new stage of development and in initiating a higher growth path.
The initial incentives lead some LS parents to finance university to their
children. In subséquent periods, the "return" to éducation is sufficiently
high for new LS parents to invest. This is the case till the economy reaches
the lower bound of the next interval, characterized by a higher growth rate.
Hence, the cross-country différences in macroeconomic adjustements to edu
cational policies can be attributed, among other factors, to différences in the
proportion of HS workers. From this point of view, the model provides an
explanation for the stages of development observed by Rostow (I960).
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the rôle of the distribution of skills in économie develop
ment through investment in human capital. The study demonstrates that,
in the absence of a crédit market for éducation, the distribution of skills
significantly affects the aggregate économie activity. Purthermore, with in-
divisibilities in investment in human capital, thèse effects are carried to
the long-term as well. Hence, growth is affected by the initial distribution
of skills, or more specifically by the percentage of individuals who hâve the
university formation level. A major conséquence due to the congestion effect
of the educational System lies in the potential existence of many constant
growth paths with no social mobility. Moreover, similar educational policies
hâve quite différent long-term effects according to the proportion of high
skilled agents. Indeed, the model provides an explanation for quite diffé
rent development paths. On the one hand, économie development of many
countries such as "dragons" which succeeded in promoting university and
initiated a higher growth path. On the other hand, developing countries
which failed to promote university and remain with a very large proportion
of low skilled individuals. Such countries are trapped in a low development
stage.Vincent Barthélémy, Philippe Michel 163
8 Appendix
A) Proof of proposition 1
We hâve seen that the spécial cases pt = 0 and pt = 1 lead to a unique value
of pt+ï. Consider now the case 0 < pt < 1. When (14) is satisfied, then we
also hâve for ail pt+\ > Pt, 1 — n < tytpt{pt+i) since pt is increasing and
case b is excluded; for pt+1 < pt, we hâve 1 - rt > pi(pt+i) and case c is
excluded. Thus when (14) is satisfied, pt+i = pt is the unique solution.
Now assume (14) is not satisfied and first that ^tpt{pt) < 1 -rt. Then
either (15) is satisfied and pt.+\ = 1 is the unique solution, or (15) is not
satisfied: tytpt(pt) < 1 — rt < ^(Pt(l) and then there exists a unique value
of pt+u pt < pt+1 < 1 which satisfies (16).
Similarly the last possibility pt{pt) > 1 -rt implies either (17) and the
disappearance of the university formation, or (18) defining a unique value
f, 0<pt+i <Pt-
B) Proof of proposition 2
Given the parameters and the past variables, the equilibrium tax rate rt
defined by (12) vérifies 0 < r( < 1. There exists then a unique optimal
number of students pt+i (proposition l);when condition (20) is satisfied,
the labor supply to the firm Ht is determined by relation (19) and the
equilibrium priées are given by (10) and (11).
C) Proof of proposition 3
The set of values of (p, 7) which verify the strict inequalities
(24)
is an open set, by continuity of *. It is enough to show that (p0,70) belongs
to this set for some 70 > 0. The function of 7 :
is continuous on [0,1] since the denominator does not vanish (for 7 = 0,
*(0Po,O,Po) > 1 since 0 > 0). It vérifies:0(O) = 0 and 0(1 - r) > 1 - r
since ^f(ppo, l-r,p0) > 1. Thus there exists a largest value 71 of 7, 7 < 1-r
such that 0(70 = 1 - r For 7 > 71, we hâve 0(7) > 1 - r. But we also hâve
at 71 :
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Thus for 70 > 71, and 70 near 71, this inequality also holds by con-
tinuity. This shows that (po,7o) does belong to the open set. The proof is
complète.
D) Proof of proposition 4
We hâve fg = (as$i - a°$2){l -p+p%) + $[* -1 -f p/3^f1 +p$3]. When
the efficiency of a formation only dépends on the TPR, the human capital
fonction in the university becomes W = \I> (lEi±i±ÉEi\ in the long-term
equilibrium, pt = p. Then * = #(7 + 0) is indépendant from p. Since
# > 1, a sufiieient condition to hâve ^ > 0 requires a3$\ - a°$2 > 0,
that is as$ — a0 > 0 when the allocation of teachers in the basic formation
is efficient.
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